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Abstract 
Historically, Spain has experienced relatively little public objection to wind power proposals, but this 
is changing in the region of Galicia, which now hosts a relatively concentrated level of wind turbines. 
To document and understand this objection, we take a cognitive mapping approach, commenting on 
its value as a method and focussing particularly on the issue of community compensation. Cognitive 
mapping structures the causal logic of individuals’ thinking, revealing this and facilitating group 
discussion. Here we compare cognitive maps that reflect different positions on the controversy. Both 
monetary and in-kind compensation are dismissed by local campaigners and local stakeholder 
representatives alike. In-kind compensation is regarded as inadequate firstly because it cannot 
provide the scale of the public goods perceived as necessary by the host community.  Secondly, the 
developer is in any case considered inappropriate as provider of public goods, which the community 








By the end of 2014, Spain had 22,986.5MW of installed wind turbine capacity, making it the 
second largest European host after Germany [1]. In 2012, wind energy supplied nearly 18% 
of total national Spanish power demand [2] and some Spanish regions are still experiencing 
significant growth in wind energy installed capacity. Unlike a number of other European 
countries, wind energy deployment in Spain, and particularly in the region of Galicia that we 
focus on here, has faced little opposition from the local communities – something that has 
facilitated the development of the sector at a national and regional level [3]. However, this 
pattern has recently been challenged in the Atlantic coast of the province of Pontevedra in 
Galicia, where new onshore projects are at the time of writing encountering strong 
resistance from local communities.  
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While the benefits of new energy infrastructure are typically accrued at regional and 
national levels, the direct effects are experienced by host communities and are often 
perceived as costs, risks and externalities [4]. Community compensation potentially 
redresses this imbalance by “transferring resources from the beneficiaries of the project to 
those badly affected by it” [5]. Such compensation measures can take a variety of forms: 
they may be monetary or in-kind; and they may be provided for individuals or communities, 
the latter being on a shared basis. Compensation measures also vary according to their main 
objective, be this to mitigate potential planning problems, compensate the local community 
for eventual accidents, or reward individuals for the risks and costs associated with these 
facilities. While there is a relatively large body of work on energy siting controversies [6] the 
literature on compensation is more modest in size [7,8,9]. There is also a related, critical 
strand of literature on the theme of justice in relation to sustainability and other policy 
appraisal across a variety of contexts [10].  
 
Originally developed to capture the processes underlying spatial cognition, cognitive 
mapping has been widely used to structure multi-faceted environmental planning and 
management problems (e.g. [11]). Yet despite the breadth of issues already explored 
through cognitive mapping, the approach has been little used to help document and 
understand community objections to renewable energy siting. We find that cognitive 
mapping has the potential to provide a structured account of the factors involved in social 
objection, focussing particularly on the perceived conceptual and causal relationships of 
factors that are salient to those involved.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, an initial section provides a short overview of the 
literature on compensation. We then describe the case study and the cognitive mapping 
methodology used. Finally, we interpret the cognitive maps of three contrasting groups of 
stakeholders, commenting on the particular contributions of the technique in terms of 
revealing ways of thinking. The stakeholders are grouped as: (i) local stakeholder 
representatives (local mayors and heads of communal land organisations); (ii) local 
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campaigners (members of local civil society organisations); and (iii) non-local stakeholder 
representatives (representatives of the Regional Government (Xunta de Galicia) and the 
Spanish Wind Energy Association). 
 
2.  Theory and practice of community compensation 
In general, research on the effect of community compensation on perceptions of facility 
siting suggests that monetary compensation does not necessarily increase the support for 
proposed projects [9]. Indeed empirical research indicates that in-kind or public goods 
compensation is better received by host communities [5][12]. The literature on 
compensation offers two main explanations for the apparent failure of monetary 
compensation to reward host communities: the ‘bribe effect’ [13][14] and the ‘crowding-out 
of public spirit’ [15][16]. The bribe-effect arises when “people feel they are being bought off 
or perceive (morally) inappropriate trade-offs between risks to environment, health or 
safety and cash payments” [5].  
 
This crowding-out of public spirit thesis suggests that monetary compensation may diminish 
the support for a project when individuals have already accepted the facility as something 
good for the public. Hence monetary compensation may crowd out the public spirit and 
reduce the willingness to accept (WTA) a facility [16]. The preference for communal, non-
monetary compensation may also reflect the finding that it tends to be easier for individuals 
to think in terms of a ‘public good’ versus ‘public harm’ trade-off than a private versus 
public trade-off, as in the first case both share a ‘public’ dimension that is difficult to 
conceptualize (one might say ethically as well as cognitively) as a private gain or loss [12].  
 
Context may also play an important role in the acceptance of compensation. Cowell et al [4] 
argue that compensation is more likely to succeed in communities where the institutional 
context has some characteristics of ‘property rule’ (i.e. the host community holds an ‘ex-
ante’ control of the development process), rather than in those governed by a ‘liability rule’ 
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(the host community only has the possibility to accept or reject compensation once the 
process is undertaken without their participation). Others have highlighted the need to 
identify and consider the specific values attached to facility siting locations, in relation to the 
proposed compensatory measures [17][18]. 
 
Research on the relationship of public participation and community ownership of wind 
energy projects has also increased in recent years. Empirical studies indicate that 
community ownership, co-ownership and local participation in combination increase public 
acceptance of wind energy schemes [19][20]. Community involvement may potentially bring 
advantages of fewer planning refusals, increased public support, more informed public 
debate and more distributed benefits to the host community. However, Warren and 
McFayden [20] identify some disadvantages of community schemes in the form of the 
reduced economies of scale arising from smaller projects and an administrative burden for 
both the community and developer (if these are not the same), concluding that community 
ownership may not be a realistic option for many rural communities. Notwithstanding the 
emergence of participatory regimes in northern European countries, particularly Denmark 
and Germany, wind power generation in Spain is largely controlled by large corporations 
and there is in fact little evidence of public attitudes towards local ownership and co-
operative renewable energy schemes in Spain to date. 
 
3. Material and methods 
3.1 Wind energy planning in Spain 
Although wind energy has experienced a rapid growth in Spain since the 1990s, Toke et al 
[21] suggest that the relatively little local opposition to this stems from Spanish rural 
populations being of low density and with limited access to a variety of resources, with the 
consequence that the Spanish countryside is perceived as a low-value living space and 
unproductive land (ibid). This may also partly account for the relative absence of local 
ownership of wind farms [3]. Besides these socioeconomic factors, though, there are also 
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institutional elements that may explain the scant local opposition to wind energy in Spain, 
such as the centralised model of spatial planning and the late development of landscape 
policies [22]. Local councils have little power in the wind energy decision-making process 
and play a secondary role, with virtually no means to reject wind farm proposals or to zone 
land as unsuitable for wind power developments [23]. In contrast, the Spanish regional 
governments (AACC) play a major role in both energy planning and facility siting in Spain. 
Each region sets its own energy plans and grants authorizations for wind energy siting [23]. 
There is also a financial incentive for local authorities to welcome wind farms: they provide 
tax revenues to the municipalities and can be important sources of income in an often 
economically depressed rural context (referred to below). 
 
In 2008 the regional government (the Xunta de Galicia) approved a new regulatory 
framework, which attempted to improve both environmental regulation and public 
participation in wind energy schemes, including land owners [24][25]. However this 
legislation was modified again by the new regional government in 2009. The new regulatory 
framework (Decree 242/2007), which is still in force at the time of writing, removes the 
participatory measures established by the precedent legislation and considers public 
participation only in terms of an Environmental Compensation Fund (ECF) [25]. This fund is 
raised through the collection of an environmental levy, the ‘canon eólico’, which taxes the 
impact of wind farms on the landscape and is intended to finance environmental projects in 
the municipalities affected by wind farms and in other locations of Galicia. 
 
Another important element to be taken into account is the way in which developers gain 
access to prospective development sites. Developers have three options to access land: 
purchase, rent or expropriation. Although the three options are possible for private 
properties, communal land cannot be purchased. As long as wind farms are considered 
‘public utilities’, landowners may be expropriated if they do not reach any agreement with 
the developer to consent the development. Although the most common option is to rent 
the land, Simón and Copena [26] argue that the “threat of expropriation has been used, in 
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many cases, to force landowners to accept relatively low prices for their land”. Moreover, 
the benefits received by landowners are an insignificant proportion of the overall revenues 
yielded by wind farms in Galicia. Simón [27] estimates that landowners’ compensation 
accounts for roughly 1% of the gross revenues generated by wind farms, whereas the same 
developments account for nearly 57% of the overall rural GDP in Galicia. 
 
Looking to the future, despite the success of the wind energy sector in the last couple of 
decades, recent regulatory changes in the national energy policy pose new threats to the 
future of the wind industry. The ‘tariff deficit’ accumulated by the Spanish utility companies 
since the liberalization of the sector in 1997 has recently led the Spanish government to 
tighten up the regulatory framework and to reduce the subsidies to renewable energy 
projects1. The new legislation will not only affect future projects, but also existing 
developments, bringing an end to the regulatory stability that has characterized the Spanish 
sector during the last decade. 
 
3.2 The ‘Pedras Negras’ wind farm proposal 
The Pedras Negras project is at the time of writing proposed for the Morrazo peninsula in 
the South-western coast of Galicia, in the province of Pontevedra (Fig. 1). The project is 
located within the Wind Energy Reserve of Morrazo, one of the areas designated by the 
regional government to host wind energy developments. There are three municipalities 
directly affected by the development: Moaña, Vilaboa and Marín. If constructed, the facility 
will have an overall installed capacity of 42 MW and will comprise 14 turbines of 3 MW and 
119 metres in height, although 21 alternative positions have been further considered within 
the WER for possible enlargements. 
 
                                                          
1The ‘tariff deficit’ in Spain has been raised due to the increasing shortfall between costs borne by the utility 
companies and the revenues raised from end-users. The Spanish government has resolved to eliminate the 












<Figure 1The Morrazo peninsula>  1 
(Source: Wikipedia, reproduced under GNU Free Documentation and Creative Commons licences) 2 
 3 
The wind farm is intended to be built in the highest area of the O Morrazo peninsula, also 4 
known as ‘Montes do Morrazo’ (Morrazo mountains), which is located between 400-600 5 
metres above sea level. The wind farm will be visible throughout the South-western coast of 6 
Galicia, which is one of the most populated areas of the region, including from the Estuaries 7 
of Vigo and Pontevedra, which are known as ‘Ría de Vigo’ and ‘Ría de Pontevedra’ 8 
respectively. These are heavily urbanized spaces with a high concentration of industries. The 9 
Ría de Vigo hosts a population of nearly half a million inhabitants (the city of Vigo alone has 10 
more than 300,000 inhabitants). In short the Pedras Negras proposal is located in a politically 11 
sensitive natural enclave.  12 
 13 
Strong opposition has emerged in the Morrazo area and the three municipalities affected by 14 
the development, since the project draft was submitted to the local councils in 2011. This 15 
opposition has been primarily led by the Platform in Defense of O Morrazo Mountains 16 
(PDMM)2, alongside the communal land organisations (Comunidades Veciñais de Montes - 17 
CVMs), whose land will host the majority of the wind turbines. An ensuing anti-wind farm 18 
campaign has successfully engaged local communities and local councils against the project 19 
(Moaña and Vilaboa voted against the wind farm, while Marín cast a blank ballot). The rest of 20 
the local political parties have supported the campaign. The Pedras Negras wind farm conflict 21 
has also reached the regional parliament of Galicia, where two political parties (BNG and 22 
                                                          
2 The Platform consists of a wide range of environmental, social and cultural organisations. Its main objective is 












PSdeG)3 have requested the cessation of the ongoing wind farm procedures. Additionally, 23 
more than 500 legal objections had been submitted to the regional government during the 24 
first half of 2013, by a wide range of opponents including social and environmental 25 
organisations, political parties, local councils and a large number of citizens from the local 26 
communities4. Community compensation is not being formally considered as part of the 27 
Pedras Negras project, but a number of community-owned schemes do manage to operate in 28 
Galicia.  29 
 30 
3.3 Method 31 
The method is case study-based, using semi-structured interviews to inform the development 32 
of cognitive maps. Cognitive mapping derives from the field of cognitive psychology, 33 
particularly Personal Construct Theory [28], which seeks to understand how humans make 34 
sense of their world by structuring concepts by contrast and similarity, organizing them in a 35 
hierarchical structure [29]. Cognitive maps are graphical representations of knowledge that 36 
organize hierarchically the concepts and relationships between them [30]. As Kearney and 37 
Kaplan [31] note, cognitive maps are “hypothesized knowledge structures embodying 38 
people’s assumptions, beliefs, facts and misconceptions about the world”. These internal 39 
representations of the external environment are considered essential for the interpretation of 40 
new information and to carry out key cognitive processes such as prediction and decision-41 
making [32].  42 
 43 
                                                          
3BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego) is a regional nationalist party. PSdeG (Partido Socialista de Galicia) is the 
regional socialist party. 
4 This is virtually the only avenue of public participation allowed in the wind energy development process. The 













Although cognitive mapping was originally intended to capture the processes underlying 44 
spatial cognition, it has been widely used to structure and assist the resolution of complex 45 
social problems, including participative environmental management problems in a variety of 46 
domains (e.g. [32]). Yet despite the wide range of issues already explored through cognitive 47 
mapping, the technique appears not to have been used to help document and understand the 48 
social acceptance and rejection of renewable energy siting proposals.  49 
 50 
Here, cognitive maps are used to make explicit the reasoning that underpins stakeholders’ 51 
attitudes towards the Pedras Negras wind farm proposal, including to what extent those 52 
attitudes vary when compensation and related participatory options are considered. To this 53 
end, ten stakeholder interviews were undertaken, plus a small, deliberative workshop with 54 
campaigners from three distinct local civil society organisations5. The developer declined to 55 
be interviewed.  56 
 57 
Both synchronous (real-time) and post-hoc methods were used to develop participants’ 58 
cognitive maps. The approach used in the workshop was synchronous and followed the 59 
method of structured conceptual content cognitive mapping (also known as 3CM) [31]. The 60 
method consists of the following steps: 61 
1. Pre-workshop identification of potential concerns and issues through an in-depth 62 
analysis of objection documents relating to the wind energy project6. The aim of this 63 
                                                          
5Luita Verde (environmental organisation), Parapente Morrazo (sport organisation) and Colectivonacionalista do 
Marín (social organization). The three organisations are integrated in the PDMM.  
6 The main concepts were captured via the legal objections presented by opponents to the regional government, 
from local news media articles and from the campaigners’ platform blog. Additional concepts were drawn from 












stage is to generate a concept list that is likely to include concepts within participants’ 64 
knowledge structures [31]. 65 
2. Participants were then presented with the pre-defined concept list based on stage 1 66 
above. They were asked to dismiss those concepts that they did not understand or 67 
did not consider important and to add those that they considered were missing but 68 
relevant. 69 
3. The researcher-facilitator grouped the concepts into several categories on a large 70 
sheet of paper, asking participants to label each group with a descriptive word or short 71 
phrase [31]. This identified concept categories and priority concepts. 72 
4. Finally, participants were asked to graphically link the different categories and 73 
concepts with arrows to establish the causal relationships among concepts. The 74 
workshop was audio-recorded in order to capture additional comments for further 75 
analysis.  76 
 77 
In the case of the interviews of key stakeholders7, for reasons of time, semi-structured 78 
interviews were conducted, supported by pre-defined questions <Appendix 1>, whilst leaving 79 
flexibility for discussion. Hence the cognitive maps in this case were developed subsequently 80 
on a post-hoc basis. Although the process of constructing maps from interviews post-hoc is 81 
rather different from the 3CM method, it likewise aims to represent the reasoning of 82 
interviewees about the topic in hand. The procedure by which such cognitive maps are 83 
constructed is detailed elsewhere [33], but briefly, the process requires the identification of 84 
                                                          
7Representatives of the Energy department of the regional government of Galicia (Xunta de Galicia); Spanish 
Wind Energy Association; Moaña Local Council; Vilaboa Local Council; Association in Defense of the Ría de Vigo 
(APDRV); Domaio Communal land organization (Asociación de Montes Vecinais de Domaio); San Adrián 












concepts, their classification in terms of causes and outcomes, the establishment of causal 85 
relationships between concepts and the construction of a hierarchical order that structures 86 
the whole map. 87 
  88 
An in-depth analysis of all of the cognitive maps was ultimately undertaken with the aid of the 89 
Decision Explorer software. This enables the construction of group maps by merging 90 
individual maps. It provides a means of comparing different stakeholders’ views, whilst 91 
highlighting both commonalities and differences. Ultimately, though, it should be noted that 92 
is impossible to completely eliminate the subjectivity of the researcher during these processes 93 
and the quality of the interviewer as listener and interpreter is key [34].  94 
 95 
4. Results 96 
Individual cognitive maps were developed through the workshop and from the interviews 97 
conducted with relevant stakeholders, to give 14 maps in total. The information in the 98 
individual maps was then condensed and transferred to collective maps that reflect the 99 
standpoint of three distinct groups of stakeholders: local campaigners (members of local civil 100 
society organisations), local stakeholder representatives (mayors and heads of communal 101 
land organisations) and non-local stakeholder representatives (i.e. representatives of AEE and 102 
Xunta de Galicia). The information transfer was undertaken with the aid of the software 103 
Decision Explorer [35], which is essentially a form of graphical support that also allows 104 
centrality and connectivity analysis. The three clusters were based on a categorisation relating 105 
to known affiliation. The process of combining maps was undertaken on the basis of 106 
conceptual overlap: where concepts and linkages are shared across maps, they are 107 












the combined map. Hence the combined maps condense and aggregate information across 109 
groups of individuals, but do not exclude it. It should be noted that a variety of methods are 110 
available for combining maps (see e.g. [36]. Here the purpose was not to produce maps that 111 
might be claimed to represent some form of average, but rather to ensure inclusion. This is 112 
more in the manner of Nakamura et al [37], who have advocated cognitive mapping as an 113 
approach to encoding knowledge of social relationships in computer databases. In such cases, 114 
the aim is to capture the sum of knowledge about a topic rather than use a form of averaging 115 
(in the general rather than mathematical sense). 116 
 117 
In cognitive maps, concepts are structured in cause-effect relationships. Arrows connect 118 
concepts that influence or have a causal relationship with others. A minus sign (-) indicates 119 
that the first concept influences negatively or counterbalances the second one. In this way, 120 
the elements of individuals’ reasoning is codified and made transparent as a complement to 121 
the qualitative understanding gained through semi-structured interviews. The full cognitive 122 
maps of each of the three stakeholder groups include too many concepts to reproduce with 123 
sufficient resolution in the main body of the paper and are appended as Figures A1, A2 and 124 
A3. Here in the main text we reproduce the simpler representations of the non-local 125 
stakeholders’ view on the role of compensation (Figure 2) and local campaigners’ view of 126 
regional wind energy planning (Figure 3). In addition, abstracting from the cognitive map of 127 
local and non-local stakeholders, appended as Figures A1 and A3, Tables 1 and 2 show the 128 
chain of consequences or causality evident in the individuals’ thinking, as output by Decision 129 
Explorer software. The more connected (‘central’) concepts include the ‘supra-municipal’ 130 
nature of the project, meaning that it is outside the jurisdiction of the municipalities and 131 
wouldn’t pay local taxes; and that local participation is perceived as insufficient and late, 132 












<Figure 2 Non-local stakeholders’ view on the role of compensation> 134 
 135 













Table 1 Consequences (causality) map for local stakeholders 138 
Note: This is output from Decision Explorer cognitive mapping software; the numbers indicate the extremity of the concept in terms of position in the causal 139 
chain. A lower value indicates a more central concept, from which other concepts follow. A higher number indicates that a concept is less central and is rather 140 
an increasingly indirect consequence of previous concepts. Each chain of conceptual causality is listed separately in relation to the wind farm proposal, each 141 
one beginning with the wind farm proposal in bold, with +1 indicating that this is the conceptual start point. The consequences are listed in two columns to 142 
condense the information. The connectivity is highest at the top left, proceeds in ranked order down the first column and then down the second column.  143 
 144 
+1 Wind farm proposal   +1 Wind farm proposal 
        may lead to           may lead to 
+47 Supra-municipal project   +10 Impact on feedstock farming 
        which can lead to           which can lead to 
+49 Doesn't pay local taxes   +7 Environmental impact 
        which can lead to     
+11 Private benefits from public land   +1 Wind farm proposal 
        which can lead to           may lead to 
+16 Deficient wind energy planning   +9 New accesses and roads 
            which can lead to 












        may lead to     
+36 Insufficient and late public participation   +1 Wind farm proposal 
        which can lead to           may lead to 
+42 Public concerns   +6 Visual impact 
            which can lead to 
+1 Wind farm proposal   +7 Environmental impact 
        may lead to     
+25 Impact on habitat and flora   +1 Wind farm proposal 
        which can lead to           may lead to 
+7 Environmental impact   +2 Noise 
            which can lead to 
+1 Wind farm proposal   +8 Health impact on neighbours 
        may lead to           which can lead to 
+23 Impact on archaeological sites   +18 Rejection of wind farm 
        which can lead to     
-20  ... [not] Sustainable communal management of the O Morrazo 
mountains 
  +1 Wind farm proposal 
            may lead to 
+1 Wind farm proposal   +3 Electromagnetic radiations 












+22 Impact on recreational activities   +8 Health impact on neighbours 
        which can lead to           which can lead to 
-20  ... [not] Sustainable communal management of the O Morrazo 
mountains 
  +18 Rejection of wind farm 
      
+1 Wind farm proposal   +1 Wind farm proposal 
        may lead to           may lead to 
+21 This is not the adequate location   +4 Pollution on water sources and land 
      
+1 Wind farm proposal   +1 Wind farm proposal 
        may lead to           may lead to 
+11 Private benefits from public land   +5 Land movements 
        which can lead to           which can lead to 















Table 2 Consequences (causality) map for non-local stakeholders   148 
+1 Wind farm proposal   +1 Wind farm proposal 
        may lead to           may lead to 
+43 Pedras Negras adds to a large number of existing wind farms   +37 Public participation 
        which can lead to           which can lead to 
+44 Repowering existing wind farms   
+38 Decentralised decision-making 
process 
        which can lead to     
+53 A regulatory framework is needed   +1 Wind farm proposal 
        which can lead to           may lead to 
+51 Difficult to put into practice   +13 Benefits 
        which can lead to     
+52 Not viable in many cases   +1 Wind farm proposal 
            may lead to 
+1 Wind farm proposal   +9 Neutral impacts 
        may lead to     
+37 Public participation   +1 Wind farm proposal 












+38 Decentralised decision-making process   +2 Negative impacts 
 149 
Note: As Table 1, this is output from Decision Explorer cognitive mapping software; the numbers indicate the extremity of the concept in terms of position in 150 
the causal chain. A lower value indicates a more central concept, from which other concepts follow. A higher number indicates that a concept is less central 151 
and is rather an increasingly indirect consequence of previous concepts. Each chain of conceptual causality is listed separately in relation to the wind farm 152 
proposal, each one beginning with the wind farm proposal in bold, with +1 indicating that this is the conceptual start point. The consequences are listed in two 153 
columns to condense the information. The connectivity is highest at the top left, proceeds in ranked order down the first column and then down the second 154 















Differences in the level of knowledge, expertise and engagement in the wind farm 159 
controversy play a determining role in the complexity of the maps. While some stakeholders, 160 
such as the representative of Luita Verde (one of the most active campaigners) and the 161 
representatives of the regional government and the EEA provided more than 40 concepts 162 
each, the maps of other actors, such as the local mayors, hardly exceeded 20 concepts.   163 
 164 
A comparative examination of the three maps provides a general understanding of how the 165 
different actors view and interpret the wind energy conflict (Figures 2-3 and Table 1). Local 166 
stakeholder representatives focused primarily on the negative impacts of the wind farm, i.e. 167 
health, human and environmental impacts <appended Figure A1>. Communal land 168 
organisations occupy a central role in the local stakeholders’ representatives’ map because 169 
the project proposal is considered to be at odds with communal land management principles 170 
and practice. Concerns about local participation and the wind energy planning in Galicia are 171 
also important factors, whilst compensation occupies a peripheral position, thus denoting a 172 
lack of consideration towards it. 173 
 174 
Although local campaigners also attached high weight to the environmental and human 175 
related impacts, they were more concerned than local stakeholder representatives about the 176 
energy planning and the socio-economic issues, including public participation and the 177 
distributive fairness of the project <Appended FigureA2>. In the local campaigners’ map, 178 
communal land management does not occupy a central position. On the contrary, communal 179 













Conversely, non-local stakeholders primarily emphasise the positive aspects of the wind farm 182 
proposal, which thus occupy the main part of the map. The negative impacts tend to be either 183 
minimised or regarded as neutral by those actors. For instance, they do not recognise the 184 
environmental impact of the development over the area (pollution, impact on flora and 185 
fauna), whereas they hold a positive view towards the landscape impact of the wind farm. 186 
Hence far from spoiling the landscape, wind turbines are perceived to enhance the visual or 187 
aesthetic value of the area. According to the representative of the Wind Energy Association, 188 
people living near previous wind farm sites in Spain had positively valued the aesthetics of the 189 
wind turbines. This may be the case in the rural and relatively impoverished areas of the 190 
interior, where wind farms have been seen as a sign of progress and development, unlike in 191 
the Morrazo area. Moreover, compensation is integrated within the cognitive map of these 192 
stakeholders and is seen as the rational way to bargain over the impacts and to reward 193 
landowners and the host community. Participatory wind energy schemes are viewed as an 194 
alternative to the project proposal, but enhanced public participation as part of that proposal 195 
was not viewed as an option. Indeed the topic of public participation was not raised by non-196 
local stakeholders without prompting <Appended Figure A3>. 197 
 198 
5. Discussion 199 
There are a number of key concepts highlighted by stakeholders and reflected differently in 200 













5.1 Distributive justice 203 
Local actors placed a high value on procedural and distributive justice, reaffirming the thesis 204 
that perceptions of fairness are just as important, if not more so, than proximity per se 205 
[38][39]. The developer (an Italian company) is regarded as a foreign interloper seeking to 206 
exploit the public land of the Morrazo mountains for its own benefit, while local communities 207 
must bear the environmental damage and the disturbance. Moreover campaigners vigorously 208 
criticized the absence of public participation in the decision-making process and the wind 209 
farms’ status of ‘public utilities’8, considering those features as deeply unfair for the local 210 
community. Indeed in the associated cognitive maps, the regional model of wind energy 211 
planning is closely related to the perceived unfairness of the current proposal (Appended 212 
Figures A1, A2 and A3), since this allegedly favours private corporate interests, leaving no 213 
room for public participation and local involvement. 214 
 215 
The results further suggest that the perceived unfairness of the wind energy policy reinforces 216 
and builds on a firmly rooted mistrust towards the developer and the regional government, 217 
confirming that trust is an essential element in the shaping of the public acceptance of wind 218 
energy siting [40][41][42]. As Zografos and Martínez-Alier [42] argue, procedural and 219 
distributive unfairness may be reinforced by the existence of a perceived ‘centre’ versus 220 
‘periphery’ imbalance in the wind energy planning and siting. Objectors compared the role of 221 
Galicia with other Spanish regions, particularly Madrid, since the first is a net exporter of 222 
electricity and the latter is a large consumer of energy resources with little to no installed 223 
wind capacity. One campaigner also highlighted the imbalance in the level of natural 224 
                                                          












protection in both regions (nearly 40% of Madrid’s territory is protected under EU law, whilst 225 
Galicia has less than 12%)9. In the most extreme case, one of the activists stated that the wind 226 
energy model in Galicia “resembles that of colonial powers”, thus emphasising the unequal 227 
relation of power between the parties involved and the specific role of the Morrazo as a 228 
marginalised and peripheral area subject to external rule.  229 
 230 
Conversely, non-local actors did not question the planning and siting procedures. Both 231 
participants stressed the adequacy of the actual decision-making process to take full account 232 
of the local concerns, taking the view that it provides sufficient information to the local 233 
councils and enables individuals and organisations to submit legal objections and/or 234 
recommendations to the regional government. While they took the view that the role of the 235 
developer is critical in terms of promoting a greater understanding of wind energy and of the 236 
proposal among the host communities, this is principally conceived of as a one-way 237 
relationship. 238 
 239 
5.2 Cumulative impacts 240 
One of the distinctive elements of the Pedras Negras conflict is the perception that the 241 
project adds to the impacts associated with neighbouring development projects (motorway 242 
construction and enlargement, industrial sites, quarry project proposal) and previous 243 
environmental disasters (oil spill, fires in the Morrazo area). Hence local campaigners do not 244 
perceive the impacts of the future wind farm in isolation, but as one threat among others in 245 
                                                          













the Morrazo peninsula. This perception and fear of cumulative impacts has been highly 246 
significant in many wind farm controversies [43][44].  247 
 248 
The cumulative impacts of the wind energy sector as a whole in Galicia are also highlighted by 249 
campaigners and representatives of communal land organisations as a major cause of 250 
opposition10. The perception is that Galicia bears an excessive level of wind energy production 251 
and associated environmental damage. Additionally, there are concerns as to the fate of the 252 
electricity produced - the electric power is partly exported to other Spanish regions - and 253 
about the inefficiency of the current electricity grid management, as wind power production 254 
is occasionally interrupted. These concerns are coupled to the observation of a continuing use 255 
of non-renewable energy sources, i.e. the renewable resource is supplementing rather than 256 
substituting for fossil fuel use. Accordingly, the representative of the Xunta land owners was 257 
of the view that a repowering option, rather than additional turbine installations, would the 258 
best strategy going forward. 259 
 260 
5.3 Compensation and values 261 
Local actors rejected the adequacy of both cash payments and the provision of public goods 262 
as compensation for the perceived environmental and social impacts.  Somewhat 263 
paradoxically, money was considered to be the wrong form of compensation, whereas in-kind 264 
compensation was seen as unable to provide the level and types of investment that the 265 
community needed. Some explicitly viewed non-monetary compensation as no less an 266 
attempt at bribery than monetary compensation. The concerns raised by local actors about 267 
                                                          
10It should be noted here that the relatively unpopulated Galicia at the time of writing has an installed wind 












monetary compensation rather support critique of the neoclassical economic assumption that 268 
environmental, social and moral values can be made comparable and commensurable by 269 
monetary means [45]. Members of the municipality of Moaña emphasised that the need to 270 
preserve the land for the next generations is directly at odds with the principle of monetary 271 
compensation. Stakeholders from Vilaboa underlined the priority of public health over any 272 
other value and the impossibility of trading off human health and money.  273 
 274 
Although local campaigners were particularly averse to compensation for proposed wind 275 
development projects, some argued that if compensatory measures were used, they should 276 
focus on communities who already ‘suffer the burdens’ of existing wind farms. Hence local 277 
stakeholders opposed compensation connected to project proposals, accepting it only for 278 
existing projects. This corresponds with the observation of Cowell et al [4] regarding the co-279 
existence of two ostensibly contradictory positions held by objectors and which can be 280 
distinguished in terms of ex-ante ‘acceptability’ and ex-post ‘acceptance’ of the project. 281 
Indeed the wind farm proposal has the characteristics of a ‘liability rule’, whereby the local 282 
community has no scope to control the development process and to negotiate the community 283 
benefits ex-ante, unlike in communities governed by a ‘property rule’ [4]. In the context of 284 
liability rules, argue Cowell et al [4], the promise of compensation does not increase the ex-285 
ante acceptability of the project, as this is not seen as adequate to fully compensate the 286 
irreplaceable value of what is lost.  287 
 288 
On the other hand, non-local actors expressed strong support for the current forms of host 289 
community compensation (Figure 2). The representative of the Xunta argued that monetary 290 












compensate the loss of value of the land (here, the value of the land is essentially seen as 292 
property value). In-kind compensation was perceived to be more suitable for offsetting 293 
impacts experienced by the whole community. This view is to some extent shared by the 294 
representative of the AEE, for whom monetary compensation is not even considered as 295 
‘compensation’ in itself, but rather as a mere commercial transaction between the developer 296 
and the landowners. For this stakeholder, the land is traded as any other commodity, so that 297 
the market value of the land is the only factor to be taken into account. Similarly, non-298 
monetary compensation was viewed as fully adequate to compensate the host community. 299 
Again, this was not regarded as ‘in-kind compensation’ per se, but rather as the usual kind of 300 
investment that is carried out by local councils with the revenues accrued from local taxes. 301 
Here, non-local actors confirm the hypothesis that ‘public’ harms are easily compensated by 302 
‘public’ investments, rather than cash payments [12]. Yet the detachment of those actors 303 
from the specific location may help explain the lack of concern towards the non-use values of 304 
the Morrazo area and the current support of monetary compensation.  305 
 306 
In sum, local actors thought about the main issues at stake as in the realm of the political 307 
deliberation, rather in the domain of economic valuation [46]. The procedural and distributive 308 
justice issues, the intrinsic natural values attributed to the area and the health threats 309 
perceived by the community were conceptualised in terms of values that hardly permit of 310 
monetary bargaining. In contrast, non-local actors considered that monetary valuation is 311 
perfectly compatible with some of the values at stake. These conflicting views demonstrate 312 
the existence of different valuation languages, justifying the need to develop conceptual and 313 
methodological approaches that take full account of the pluralism of values present in this 314 














5.4 Community-owned wind energy schemes 318 
Unlike monetary and in-kind compensation, the prospect of more community-focused wind 319 
energy projects (co-operatives and projects fully or partly owned by local councils) was widely 320 
accepted by participants. These attitudes confirm to some extent the evidence drawn from 321 
previous studies on the public perception of community-owned schemes [19][20]. Most of the 322 
opponents considered such schemes as a potential solution to the lack of local involvement, 323 
rather than a way to compensate the community for environmental damage or disturbance. 324 
Nevertheless, for the local campaigners, participatory schemes are only acceptable insofar as 325 
they are limited to small-scale projects aiming to cover the local consumption of electricity.  326 
 327 
Non-local actors also had positive attitudes towards other forms of ownership in the wind 328 
energy business. However they were more sceptical about the eventual success of those 329 
projects. The economy of scale that is needed to develop a wind farm in a cost-effective way 330 
and the difficulty of feeding the excess of electricity generated into the grid, along with the 331 
inherent complexity of the power plant management, were viewed as the main barriers to the 332 
success of self-consumption and community-owned schemes. The disadvantages identified 333 
correspond with those outlined by Warren and McFayden [19] and the supplementary 334 
difficulty of electricity grid access has been frequently identified as a barrier to the 335 















5.5 Methodological commentary 340 
The literature on energy siting controversies is largely based on qualitative and quantitative 341 
case study work, framed in terms of various theories and undertaken according to the norms 342 
of differing research philosophies. It needs to be asked what additionality cognitive mapping 343 
brings to existing approaches. We see this as consisting of several, mutually reinforcing 344 
contributions. Firstly, the explicit articulation of individuals’ reasoning and the presentation of 345 
this to the same people, particularly in a group context, does facilitate reflection and 346 
discussion. Group feedback can of course be undertaken without cognitive mapping, but the 347 
graphical representation of reasoning, positions and beliefs does support debate and 348 
reflection. It also enables differences to be observed and discussed in terms that are one step 349 
removed from the principles themselves. For this discursive purpose, cognitive maps as visual 350 
representations are also relatively intuitive and easy to interpret. Similarly, in the simpler 351 
analytic versions, the concepts of centrality and connectedness are relatively easy to grasp – 352 
cognitive mapping is well suited to giving the type of output shown in Tables 1 and 2 and is 353 
also capable of considerably more sophistication. Cognitive maps also enable the summary of 354 
multifaceted issues in a concise structure with relatively minimal overlay of a priori 355 
theoretical constructs. Rather the constructs come from the individuals, albeit to some extent 356 
assisted (in this case at least) by initial scoping of issues salient in the controversy.  With this 357 
method, the researcher's role is to prompt, elicit and document participants' ideas, rather 358 
than to test or reveal according to a pre-existing theoretical frame or hypotheses. 359 
 360 
Overall, the lack of an a priori theoretical frame makes cognitive mapping particularly suited 361 
to exploratory work. Cognitive mapping does also have some similarities with other methods 362 
of analysis: while not using the scales of attitudinal surveys, it does permit aggregation of 363 












interviews. Moreover, while the ability to show a pattern of ordered conceptual connections 365 
is in one sense unique, ranking of the significance of issues can and often is achieved in 366 
surveys. The difference is that such ranking is usually interpreted in relation to attitudes 367 
rather than cognition in the sense of knowledge and understanding. This said, in showing 368 
individuals’ prioritisation of issues cognitive maps reflect not just knowledge and 369 
understanding, but also attitudes. Their representation is in terms that emphasise conceptual 370 
linkages, but value weightings are nonetheless involved. 371 
 372 
6. Conclusions 373 
Cognitive mapping is able to provide succinct, condensed and comparable representations of 374 
the structure of stakeholder thinking in an energy siting controversy, in this case the Pedras 375 
Negras wind power proposal in Galicia, Spain. While many of the objections raised by the 376 
local stakeholders in this case are typical of objections elsewhere in Europe, some are quite 377 
particular to Spain, notably a land use planning system that readily permits compulsory 378 
purchase of land in this context and others. A perception of forced land appropriation has led 379 
to further perceptions of procedural and distributive unfairness, which interact with a strong 380 
sense of regional cultural identity and place attachment. In contrast, non-local stakeholders 381 
gave little weight to the consequences that local stakeholders considered negative, whilst 382 
highlighting perceived positive outcomes anticipated at local, regional and national levels.  383 
 384 
For most local stakeholders, neither monetary nor in-kind compensation would make the 385 
project acceptable, whereas for non-local stakeholders, compensation would be acceptable 386 
and of the same order as a market trade. The causality chains evident in the cognitive maps 387 












for discussion and debate. Overall, we would suggest that even simple forms of cognitive 389 
mapping can perform well not only as an exploratory method, clarifying and revealing key 390 
aspects of a controversy, but also providing detailed information of value in its own right.  391 
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